Recently, Zou et al. [Phys. Rev. A 82, 042325 (2010)] pointed out that two arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes are not secure, because an arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between two users when a receiver repudiates the integrity of a signature. By using a public board, they try to propose two AQS schemes to solve the problem. This work shows that the same security problem may exist in their schemes and also a malicious party can reveal the other party's secret key without being detected by using the Trojan-horse attacks. Accordingly, two basic properties of a quantum signature, i.e. unforgeability and undeniability, may not be satisfied in their scheme.
Introduction
Quantum signature, which concerns about the authenticity and non-repudiation of quantum states on an insecure quantum channel [1, 2] , is one of the most important researches in quantum cryptography. By exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics, e.g., no-cloning theory and measurement uncertainty, quantum signature can provide unconditional security. Two basic properties are required in a quantum signature [1] :
1. Unforgeability: Neither the signature verifier nor an attacker can forge a signature, or change or attach the content of a signature. The signature should not be reproduced by any other person.
2. Undeniability: A signatory, Alice, who has sent the signature to the verifier, Bob, cannot later deny having signed a signature. Moreover, the verifier Bob cannot deny the receipt of the signature.
Quantum signature was first investigated by Gottesman and Chuang [3] . After that, a variety of quantum signature schemes have been proposed [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] . Zeng et al. [1] proposed an arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme based on the correlation of GHZ states and quantum one-time pads. However, Curty et al. [6] pointed out that [1] is not clearly described and the security statements claimed by the authors are incorrect. In the reply comment [7] , Zeng gave a more detailed presentation and proof to their original AQS scheme [1] . To improve the transmission efficiency and to reduce the implementation complexity of [1, 7] , Li et al. [8] proposed an AQS scheme using Bell states and claimed that their improvements can preserve the merits in the original scheme [1, 7] .
In an AQS scheme, an arbitrator plays a crucial role. When a dispute arises between the users, the arbitrator should be able to arbitrate the dispute. The arbitrator should be able to solve a dispute when a receiver, Bob, repudiates the receipt of the signature, or in particular, the receiver repudiates the integrality of the signature, i.e., Bob admits receiving a signature but denies the correctness of the signature. The dispute of the latter one implies the following three cases Since the arbitrator in [1, 7, 8] cannot solve the dispute when Bob claims that the verification of a signature is not successful, Zou et al. [15] considered that these schemes are not valid because the security requirement of a quantum signature, i.e., the undeniability, is not satisfied.
By using a public board, Zou et al. also proposed two AQS schemes to solve the problem. However, this study will point out that the same security problem may exist in their schemes. That is, when Bob announces that the verification is not successful, the arbitrator may not be able to distinguish which case described above has happened. Besides, this study also tries to investigate if a malicious signer, Alice, can reveal Bob's secret key without being detected by performing the Trojan-horse attacks [16, 17] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Zou et al. 
where |P i and K i denote the ith bit of |P and K, σ x and σ z are the Pauli matrices, respectively.
To prevent the integrality of a signature from being disavowed by Bob, Zou et al. proposed two AQS schemes: the AQS scheme using Bell states and the AQS without using entangled states, respectively. Their schemes are described as follows.
Scheme 1: the AQS scheme using Bell states
Suppose that Alice wants to sign an n-bit quantum message |P to Bob. In order to perform the signature, three copies of |P are necessary. The scheme proceeds as follows:
Initializing phase:
Step I 1. The arbitrator Trent shares the secret keys K A , K B with Alice and Bob respectively through some unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocols.
Step I2. Alice generates n Bell states,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the subscripts A and B denote the 1 st and the 2 nd particles of that Bell state, respectively. After that, Alice sends all B particles to Bob in a secure and authenticated way [19, 20] .
Signing phase
Step S1. Alice chooses a random number r ∈ {0, 1} 2n to encrypt all |P 's, i.e.,
Step S2. Alice generates |S A = E KA (|P ′ ).
Step S3. Alice combines each |P ′ i and the Bell state to obtain a three-particle entangled state, Step S4. Alice performs a Bell-measurement on each |φ i and obtains the
, and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Step S5. Alice sends |S = (|P ′ , |S A , |M A ) to Bob.
Verification phase:
Step V 1. Bob encrypts |P ′ and |S A with K B and sends the quantum cipher-
Step V 2. Trent decrypts |Y B with K B and obtains |P ′ and |S A . Then he encrypts |P ′ with K A and gets |S T . If |S T = |S A [8, 22] , Trent sets the verification parameter V = 1; otherwise, V = 0.
Step V 3. Trent recovers |P ′ from |S T . Then he encrypts |P ′ , |S A and V with K B and sends the quantum ciphertext
to Bob.
Step V 4. Bob decrypts |Y T and gets |P ′ , |S A , and V . If V = 0, Bob rejects the signature; otherwise, Bob continues to the next step.
Step informs Alice to publish r and proceeds to the next step; otherwise, he rejects the signature.
Step V 6. Alice publishes r on the public board.
Step V 7. Bob recovers |P from |P ′ by r and holds (|S A , r) as Alice's signature for the quantum message |P .
Scheme 2: the AQS scheme without using entangled states
Since the preparation, distribution, and storing of quantum entangled states are not easily implemented with today's technologies, Zou et al. also proposed an AQS scheme without using entangled states (Scheme 2) in the signing phase and the verifying phase. In order to prevent a signature from being disavowed by Bob, a public board is also used in the proposed scheme. The scheme is described as follows.
Step I 1 ′ . The arbitrator Trent shares the secret keys K AT , K BT with Alice and Bob respectively through some unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocols. Similarly, Alice shares a secret key, K AB , with Bob.
Signing phase:
Step S1 ′ . Alice chooses a random number r ∈ {0, 1} 2n and then computes
, where |P is as defined before.
Step S2 ′ . Alice generates |S A = E KAT (|P ′ ).
Step S3 ′ . Alice generates |S = E KAB (|P ′ , |R AB , |S A ) as her signature and then sends it to Bob.
Step V 1 ′ . Bob decrypts |S with K AB and obtains |P ′ , |R AB and |S A . Then he generates |Y B = E KBT (|P ′ , |S A ) and sends it to Trent.
Step V 2 ′ . Trent decrypts |Y B with K BT and obtains |P ′ and |S A .
Step Step Step V 5 ′ . If V B = 0, Alice and Trent abort the scheme; otherwise, Alice announces r on the public board.
Step V 6 ′ . Bob recovers |P from |P ′ by r and holds (|S A , r) as Alice's signature for the quantum message |P .
Problems to be discussed
This section tries to investigate problems that could arise on Zou et al.'s schemes if precautions are not taken. We first discuss the deniable dilemma. Then, we investigate the Trojan-horse attacks against the schemes.
The deniable dilemma
In Zou et al.'s schemes, the signatory Alice uses a random number r to protect the quantum message |P (i.e., |P ′ = E r (|P )) before signing it. After the ar- 
Step S5. In Scheme 2, Alice intentionally sent |S = E KAB |P ′ , R AB , |S A with Furthermore, as also pointed out in [15] , the signer, Alice, is able to publish an arbitrary r ′ ( = r) in her favor without been verified, which is obviously against the requirement of a signature scheme.
The Trojan-horse attack
In Zou et al.'s schemes, there are two transmissions of the same quantum signals,
i.e. first from Alice to Bob, and then from Bob to the arbitrator. Therefore, the malicious Alice can reveal Bob's secret key without being detected by performing the Trojan-horse attacks [16, 17] . Similar to [5] , there are two attack strategies in the Trojan-horse attacks: the invisible photon eavesdropping [16] and the delay photon eavesdropping [17] . The following will discuss the invisible photon eavesdropping (IPE) on Zou et al.'s schemes and show that Alice can obtain Bob's secret key without being detected. Note that, Alice can also use the delay photon eavesdropping to reveal Bob's secret key in the same way.
In Scheme 1, in order to reveal Bob's secret key K B , Alice can perform the IPE attack on the communications in Step S5 and Step V 1 as follows:
Step S5a. Alice first prepares a set of eavesdropping states, 
Step V 1a. Bob encrypts |P ′ d1 and |S A with K B and sends the quantum ci- Note that, Alice can also use the similar ways mentioned above to obtain Bob's secret key K BT in Scheme 2. Since both Scheme 1 and 2 are insecure to the Trojan-horse attacks, Bob can deny having verified a signature. Therefore, the basic properties of a quantum signature, i.e. unforgeability and undeniability,
are not satisfied in their schemes.
Conclusions
This study has pointed out two security flaws in Zou et al.'s AQS schemes, in which the arbitrator cannot arbitrate the dispute between Alice and Bob when Bob claims failure in his verification. Besides, a malicious signer can obtain verifier's secret key by performing the Trojan-horse attacks. How to improve their AQS schemes to avoid the problems mentioned in this paper will be an interesting future research.
